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ARTICLE V: THE COMATOSE ARTICLE OF 
OUR LIVING CONSTITUTION?* 
Robert G. Dixon, Jr.** 
CAPACITY for steady--even startling-development and relative incapacity for formal change, are twin features of American 
constitutionalism often noticed but seldom analyzed conjointly. 
Even the most stalwart supporters of the status quo do not want an 
unamendable Constitution, but disagreement as to how change 
should be effected, and the scope of it, runs deep. Indeed, this is the 
central problem of Marbury v. Madison.1 That case was the effective 
innovator of judicial review, our "real" system for developmental 
constitutionalism. Interestingly, it also was one of the quite rare in-
stances when a seemingly simple constitutional text was at issue 
(scope of Supreme Court original jurisdiction), one readily suscep-
tible of formal amendment without raising larger issues of structure 
or policy for the rest of our public law system. 
To be sure, there have been twenty-five formal constitutional 
amendments pursuant to article V, four of which date only from 
1951. But laying aside the ten in the Bill of Rights, which were really 
a continuation of the original process of constitution-making, and 
the three Civil War amendments, which were part of the unique 
process of reformation of the Union, how many of the remaining 
twelve could not be put in the "so what" category? 
The sixteenth, removing doubts concerning the constitutionality 
of income taxation, concerned a supposed limitation on congres-
sional power which should never have been in the Constitution in 
the first place. For, if self-preservation is the "first law of govern-
ment" as Lincoln said during the Civil War, then taxation is well-
nigh the first power, limited only by current calculations of need. 
Even wielders of naked force expect to be paid. The prohibition and 
repeal amendments involved sumptuary matters which properly 
have no place in constitutional text. In practical effect the "noble 
experiment" did little more than contribute materially to the rise 
of organized crime in this country. The remaining amendments in-
• Copyright 1968 by The Oxford University Press. This Article is adapted with 
permission from a chapter in the author's Democratic Representation: Reapportion• 
ment in Law and Politics to be published by the Oxford University Press.-Ed. 
•• Professor of Law, George Washington University. A.B. 1943, Ph.D. 1947, Syra-
cuse University; LL.B. 1956, George Washington University.-Ed. 
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME I.Aw (E. Cahn 
ed. 1954). 
[ 931] 
932 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:931 
volve only structural details, save the anti-poll tax amendment in 
1964. But because poll tax.es at that time had sign:6.cant discrimina-
tory effect on voter eligibility in only two states-Alabama and 
Mississippi-and the judicial process of developmental constitu-
tionalism seemed about to correct that situation anyway,2 the twenty-
fourth amendment was more a symbolic (and politically inexpensive) 
gesture than a major blow for civil rights. 
Even the structural changes brought about by some amendments, 
such as the limitation on the number of presidential terms and 
provision for presidential succession in the twenty-second and twenty-
fifth amendments and the specification of presidential and congres-
sional terms of office as beginning in January in the twentieth 
amendment, seem to reflect not so much great national policy 
decisions as general consensus on matters of detail, some of which are 
properly more allocable to statutory than constitutional control. 
The Founding Fathers can hardly be faulted for missing the mark 
in picking March 4 as the original inauguration date for the Presi-
dent, but a formal amendment to the commerce clause would be a 
far different matter. 
What then of article V? Is it little more than a constitutional toy 
for occasional distraction and amusement while the large public 
policy and living constitution battles take place elsewhere? Must-
or should-this be its role? Are there inherent limitations on article 
V which should be frankly admitted, or are improvements possible? 
Is judicial review a self-sufficient device controlling the direction and 
pace of constitutional development? 
I. THE REAPPORTIONMENT AMENDMENT EXAMPLE 
On two occasions in recent history, one being the school prayer 
decisions of 1962-19633 and the other being the reapportionment de-
cisions of 1964,4 rulings of the Supreme Court have evoked not only 
strong feeling but a drive to amend the Constitution to undo or 
modify the decisions. Laying aside questions as to the wisdom of 
2. See, e.g., Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 
641 (1966); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); 1961 COMMISSION 
ON CML RIGHTS, REPORT ON VOTING (1961). 
3. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
4. The cases decided with full opinions after oral argument were the Colorado 
case: Lucas v. Forty-fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); the Delaware case: 
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); the Virginia case: Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 
(1964); the Maryland case: Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 
U.S. 656 (1964); the New York case: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964); and 
the Alabama case: Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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modifying these decisions, it was in each case far easier to criticize 
the Court's decision than to draft a satisfactory "repealing" amend-
ment. The real lesson to be learned from the apparently dying 
reapportionment amendment campaign and the school prayer cam-
paign may simply be this: It is easy to make a major constitutional 
modification by judicial decision but almost impossible thereafter to 
draft an amendment to undo the one unpopular decision without 
affecting anything else or creating new problems. For example, if 
the proposed prayer amendment used the phrase "nonsectarian," a 
round of fresh uncertainty for school boards and courts would follow; 
if the amendment itself tried to define the term, prospects for agree-
ment would be dim.5 The principal draft of Representative Becker, 
although avoiding that difficulty, did create at least one major un-
certainty by authorizing school prayers in any "institution or place" 
on a "voluntary basis."6 What is "voluntary" when attendance is 
compulsory as in public schools, penal institutions, or military 
service? 
The difficulties with the various reapportionment amendment 
drafts in Congress in 1965 and 1966 were considerably more intricate 
and will be a principal focus of this paper as a case study in the 
problems of implementing article V. Although seldom accurately 
reported in the press, the aim of the only amendments to receive 
serious consideration was not to repeal the "one man-one vote" 
principle but only to undo one of the "big six" reapportionment 
decisions of 1964, Lucas v. Forty-fourth General Assembly.7 The 
other decisions-the principal opinion being attached to the Ala-
bama case, Reynolds v. Sims8-laid down the basic proposition that 
5. See colloquy between Congressman Byron G. Rogers and Professor Paul A. 
Freund in Hearings on School Prayers Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1657 (1964). 
6. See H.J. Res. 693, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), commonly referred to as the 
"Becker amendment," § I of which read: "Nothing in this Constitution shall be 
deemed to prohibit the offering, reading from, or listening to prayers or biblical 
scriptures, if participation therein is on a voluntary basis, in any governmental or 
public school, institution, or place.'' 
7, 377 U.S. 713 (1964). See generally Dixon, Reapportionment in the Supreme Court 
and Congress: Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REv. 209 
(1964), where it is suggested that either the due process or republican government 
guarantee clauses would have been a better basis than the equal protection clause for 
the reapportionment rulings. With equal protection the grounding, it is logically dif-
ficult to distinguish the apportionment bases for the Senate and House of Representa-
tives. Moreover, if equal protection is the measure it would logically also render in-
valid many unequalizing internal legislative practices which enhance the influence of 
some citizens, e.g., the constituents of the committee chairman who get their posts by 
seniority rule. 
8. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
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state legislators should be elected from districts of equal population 
(or proportional population in the case of multimember districts). 
In Lucas, which was a "majorities in conflict" case, the Court added 
the rule that both legislative houses must be on this basis even if the 
people of a state had rejected this idea by statewide referendum and 
had chosen to place one house on a modified population basis. The 
common purpose of one of the drafts of Senator Church, of the 
modified version of Senate Minority Leader Dirksen, and of the draft 
of Senator Javits was to keep both state houses on an equal popula-
tion basis as an initial premise, but to allow the people by popular 
referendum to place one house on some other basis.9 
A. Drafting Difficulties 
As the debate and re-drafting went on, refinement followed re-
finement so that some drafts came to resemble an election code. But 
constitutional amendments, with a few exceptions, are noted for their 
brevity, if not their clarity. Lack of clarity is less consequential when 
only in futuro effect is intended, as with the creative process of 
elaborating the meaning of the fourteenth amendment due process 
and equal protection clauses. In regard to a possible reapportionment 
amendment, however, the purpose was to modify only the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lucas and leave untouched the other decisions. 
The Washington Post editorially characterized the issue as follows: 
"Such a carefully limited plan would not amount to going back to 
the 'rotten-borough system' which Qustice] Douglas so vigorously 
deplored. Rather, it would merely allow the states some of the discre-
tion that they always exercised in shaping their own governments."10 
And yet, consider the following examples of the practical problems 
which arose as draft followed draft in an attempt to devise such a 
limited amendment. 
First, should there be express provision for continuing judicial 
review of apportionment or should there be silence, with reliance on 
the general tradition of judicial review as it is expanded or contracted 
by changing judicial concepts of activism and restraint? The opening 
sentence of the initial Dirksen draft of S.J. Res. 2,11 until deleted in 
9. S.J. Res. 38, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Senator Church, Feb. 2, 1965); S.J. Res. 44, 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (Senator Javits, Feb. 8, 1965); S.J. Res. 66, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 
as amended, July 22, 1965, to substitute the "Dirksen amendment" (S.J. Res. 2 as 
amended) for its original terms. 
10. Editorial, The Washington Post, March 8, 1965, at A 14, col. 2. 
11. S.J. Res. 2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced Jan. 6, 1965, by Senator Dirksen 
for himself and thirty-seven other senators, began as follows: "The right and power 
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subcommittee, seemed to point away from actually impeding judi-
cial review. Some Senators, however, favored specified review powers. 
Might not such a provision deprive the Court of its traditional 
capacity to control its work and to avoid untimely handling of awk-
ward questions by manipulating such flexible concepts as "standing 
to sue" and "justiciability"? 
Second, should the draft amendment seek to regulate the man-
ner in which the people of a state give their assent to placing one 
legislative house on a basis other than strict equal population dis-
tricts? Specifically, should the people simply vote on the general idea 
of having a "federal plan" or a "modified federal plan" (that is, one 
house based on population, the other on political subdivisions or 
some mixed formula), with details left to the legislature or a state 
constitutional convention? Or should the people vote on a specific 
plan? If the latter, should there be provision for a choice among 
plans, or for successive presentation of different plans? 
Third, should there be provision for periodic popular consul-
tation-say, a decennial referendum-on such a reapportionment 
formula regardless of the outcome of the initial vote? Here again, 
the question would recur whether the voters should have a choice 
among competing plans or be allowed simply to cast a yes-no vote 
on one measure. In lieu of such detailed specification of the num-
ber and character of referenda required to adopt and continue a 
federal plan, would it be preferable and simpler to require a popular 
initiative process for each state for this topic? Under existing law 
only a minority of states authorize an initiative process whereby the 
people can effect governmental change without resort to the legisla-
ture. 
Fourth, to what extent should a federal amendment seek to 
define the number and character of nonpopulation factors which 
could be incorporated in a modified federal plan or mixed appor-
tionment formula? Some of the Dirksen and J avits drafts spoke 
simply of "reasonable weight to factors other than population."12 
The American Bar Association proposal spoke of apportionment 
"in part by reference to geography, county and city lines, economic 
conditions, history, and other factors."13 Apart from the difficulty of 
to determine the composition of the legislature of a State and the apportionment of 
the membership thereof shall remain in the people of that State." 
12. S.J. Res. 2, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (with minor changes made before the 
vote); S.J. Res. 44, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). 
13. Text as approved by House of Delegates, Feb. 8, 1965. 
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getting agreement on a list of limiting standards, the incorporation 
of such provisions in an amendment raises several policy questions. 
Would the list hinder the process of tailoring an apportionment 
system to the needs of a particular state? Would the list impede the 
traditional processes of judicial review, which otherwise could be 
relied upon to negate either specifically impermissible standards, 
such as race, or generally "unreasonable" standards? 
Fifth, as a corollary to the "other factors" question,· should the 
amendment seek to limit in arithmetical terms the extent of per-
missible deviation from an equal population district premise? Such 
a provision might be phrased as follows: 
Nothing in this Constitution or judicial interpretations thereof 
shall limit the right and power of the people of a state, expressed 
through statewide referendum, to apportion one house of the state 
legislature by population and the second house by a mixture of 
population and nonpopulation considerations provided the resul-
tant deviations from mean population in the districts for the sec-
ond house do not exceed an average deviation of X percent and a 
maximum deviation of Y percent .... 
Taking this route might obviate the need for any finite list of non-
population factors which could be utilized. Average deviation, it 
should be noted, is the most meaningful arithmetical measure of 
"malapportionment," notwithstanding the typical practice of focus-
ing on the extremes. Although a rule of reason could and should 
be judicially maintained, there would be more room for traditional 
and realistic political negotiation and no need to prove that each 
district line was "rational" in the sense of being a logically con-
sistent derivation from a specified list of factors. 
This summary of the kinds of questions which arise in attempt-
ing to devise a text for a narrow reapportionment amendment is 
not exhaustive. It does serve to document the proposition that even 
with more congressional support than the amendment proponents 
were able to muster, the task of devising a satisfactory text would 
not have been easy. Incorporating any significant number of the 
suggestions listed above could have produced not a constitutional 
amendment but an election code. 
B. Ratification by Unreapportioned Legislatures 
I. Justiciability 
No constitutional amendment has yet been declared "unconstitu-
tional" although for a time the Supreme Court seemed to treat the 
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amendment process as subject to judicial review.14 This view was 
apparently repudiated in Coleman v. Miller,15 which is the latest 
Supreme Court treatment of the amending power. That case, heard 
before eight Justices, involved the initiated but unratified child labor 
amendment. The Court ruled that both the issue of undue time lapse 
for ratification following congressional initiation and the power of 
the Kansas legislature to give approval after having initially rejected 
the amendment were "political questions" for Congress, not the 
Court, to decide. Four concurring justices, including Justices Black 
and Douglas who are still sitting, went further, stating their view in 
strong terms that the amending process was " 'political' in its entirety 
from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitu-
tion, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference 
at any point."16 
If the Supreme Court were to ignore the Coleman dictum and be 
willing to review a reapportionment amendment, would ratification 
by some malapportioned state legislatures be deemed such a "boot-
strap" operation as to jeopardize the amendment's constitutionality? 
The essence of the argument would be that the amendment was a 
minority imposition on the American people and hence not a ratifi-
cation as contemplated by article V. At least two preliminary counter-
arguments could be made: first, the amendment would not have been 
proposed unless supported by a two-thirds vote in both houses of 
Congress; second, even after ratification by three-fourths of the 
states, a reapportionment amendment of the Javits or Dirksen type 
would contemplate deviation from the equal population district 
standard only if the deviation were approved by a statewide popular 
referendum. 
2. Powers of Malapportioned Legislatures 
The starting premise is that a malapportioned legislature is com-
petent to discharge its customary tasks as the legislative organ of the 
state including, as the Supreme Court indicated in the Maryland 
case,17 enactment of reapportionment measures. Indeed, this premise 
follows inexorably from the proposition frequently announced both 
before and after the reapportionment cases of 1964 that reapportion-
14. See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1930); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 
l!68 (1921); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. ll!0 (1922); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 
l!50 (1920); Hawke v. Smith No. I, 25l! U.S. 221 (1920). 
15. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
16. Id. at 456. 
17. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 675-76 (1964). 
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ment is a legislative function and that the problem is to galvanize 
the legislature into action. Because reapportionment is necessary only 
when the legislature has become malapportioned, the current mal-
apportioned body must be empowered to reapportion-unless the 
function be removed from the legislature entirely. Accordingly, 
following the Court's lead, virtually every court which has dealt with 
reapportionment has accorded primacy to legislative action, stepping 
in only when the malapportioned legislature fails to act in appro-
priate fashion on reapportionment. 
A special question might arise, however, concerning the power 
of a malapportioned legislature to initiate an apportionment amend-
ment to the state constitution-and perhaps, by analogy, to ratify 
a proposed federal apportionment amendment, which is the present 
question. The legislative initiative in amending state constitutions 
may take either of two forms: the legislature may call a convention 
to consider an amendment or submit a proposed amendment di-
rectly to the people. The general tendency in the post-Reynolds era 
has been to make no distinction between the power of a malappor-
tioned legislature to reapportion itself by statute or by instituting a 
state constitutional convention. Malapportioned legislatures have in-
stituted constitutional conventions either to sanction a plan already 
put in force by the malapportioned legislature, as in Connecticut, or 
to make a fresh start, as in New Jersey, Hawaii, and Maryland. In 
a preliminary phase of Tennessee reapportionment, a challenge to 
a legislative call of_ a constitutional convention for reapportion-
ment was dismissed on the ground that even though the convention, 
like the legislature, would be malapportioned, it would only have 
power to propose and not to take final action.18 
The more precise analogy, however, to the yet undecided ques-
tion of the power of a malapportioned state legislature to ratify a 
federal amendment, is the question of the power of such a legisla-
ture directly to propose a state constitutional amendment on ap-
portionment. In one recent case, a federal district court in Nebraska 
refused either to enjoin submission of a constitutional amendment 
proposed by the malapportioned legislature or to rule on the amend-
ment's validity prior to expression of popular feeling.19 By contrast, 
in Toombs v. Fortson,20 a Georgia federal district court ruled that 
18. West v. Carr, 212 Tenn. 367, 370 S.W.2d 469 (1963). 
19. League of Nebraska Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 194-95 (D. Neb. 
1962). 
20. Toombs v. Fortson, Civ. Action No. 7883 (N.D. Ga., June 30, 1964). The order 
was entered despite the innocuous nature of the proposed new constitutional clause 
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a malapportioned legislature was incompetent to submit a state con-
stitutional reapportionment amendment to the people. This latter 
case reached the Supreme Court, but the question was mooted by 
an intervening election before appeal. The Court partially vacated 
the ruling and remanded with a short per curiam opinion which 
seemingly had the effect of placing the matter in limbo and robbing 
the lower court order of any precedential effect. Justice Goldberg, 
in a dissenting opinion, found the Court's remand order "mystify-
ing" and wanted to make it crystal clear that the Court was leaving 
open the question of the power of a malapportioned legislature to 
initiate constitutional change.21 
Another recent case presenting, in part, the same question also 
failed to result in a clear holding by the Supreme Court. In a com-
plicated series of events in Hawaii, a federal district court disallowed 
both interim use of a legislature-passed reapportionment plan and 
its contemplated submission to the voters as a constitutional amend-
ment.22 The ruling, however, was based on an alleged federal con-
stitutional defect in the plan itself-denial of equality of voter rep-
resentation by using multimember districts to create "monoliths"23 
-rather than an intrinsic lack of power in a malapportioned legis-
lature to propose constitutional amendments. The district court's 
ruling concerning multimember districts was reversed by the Su-
preme Court for lack of appropriate proof of invidious effect, but 
the machinery for a constitutional convention set in motion by the 
legislature under district court pressure was allowed to stand.24 
Thus, except for the ambiguous per curiam opinion in Toombs, 
the Supreme Court has not indicated its views on the power of mal-
apportioned legislatures to submit a reapportionment amendment 
to the people directly. Perhaps there is little difference in effect 
on reapportionment. It did no more than fix the size of the two houses, repeal all other 
provisions, and empower the legislature to reapportion as it wished-under the over-
all restraint, of course, of the federal equal population principle. If we assume that a 
malapportioned legislature is incompetent to initiate a constitutional amendment, as 
the Georgia federal district court ruled, then what of provisions in some states where 
eight per cent of the people may initiate constitutional change by petition? Does equal 
opportunity to utilize the petition process make the difference? 
21. Fortson v. Toombs, 379 U.S. 621, 631-34 (1965). Justice Harlan in a separate 
opinion could find "nothing •.. in the Constitution, or in any decision of this Court 
which requires a State to initiate complete or partial constitutional change only by 
some method in which every voice in the voting population is given an opportunity 
to express itself." Id. at 626. 
22. Holt v. Richardson, 238 F. Supp. 468 (D. Hawaii 1965); Holt v. Richardson, 240 
F. Supp. 724 (D. Hawaii 1965). 
23. Holt v. Richardson, 240 F. Supp. 724, 730 (D. Hawaii 1965). 
24. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966). 
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between this question and that of the power to call a convention, 
especially where the convention is to consider a plan already in 
force.25 
II. ARTICLE V AND THE "ONE MAN-ONE VOTE" PRINCIPLE 
A. Ratification by Malapportioned Legislature of 
Federal Amendment 
Analogies from the state constitution cases aside, the question 
of the power of a malaportioned state legislature to ratify a reap-
portionment amendment to the federal constitution would never 
be aired if the Supreme Court adhered to the view of the four con-
curring justices in Coleman that constitutional amendment disputes 
are "political questions" not judicially reviewable. The easing of 
the political question disability in Baker v. Carr,26 however, might 
presage a willingness to review the merits of the question. If so, 
the basic question would be the power of a malapportioned legis-
lature to ratify any constitutional amendment. A recent essay seeking 
to maintain the thesis that a malapportioned legislature could not 
ratify a reapportionment amendment conceded that the argument 
was equally applicable to ratification of any amendment.27 The 
central premise was that the Constitution, including its judicial 
gloss, is higher law and invalidates all governmental actions incon-
sistent with its announced commands and proscriptions. 
In realistic terms, therefore, the question would be whether a 
state legislature, even one properly reconstructed after Reynolds, 
could ratify any constitutional amendment without having reap-
portioned itself under the most recent decennial census.28 A flat 
rule that such a legislature could not ratify any amendment would 
demonstrate by reductio ad absurdum the fallibility of the premise. 
Since many legislatures would be regularly affected, this rule would 
25. Of special significance may be the more recent ruling of the Supreme Court in 
the famous disputed Georgia governorship election. Fortson v. Morris, !185 U.S. 2!ll 
(1966). There the Court upheld, five-to-four, the power of the malapportioned Georgia 
legislature (partially reapportioned but under court mandate to reach full compli-
ance) to elect Lester G. Maddox governor of Georgia in 1966 when neither he nor his 
Republican opponent, Howard H. "l3o" Calloway, received the necessary majority of 
the popular vote. 
26. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
27. Wolf, An Antireapportionment Amendment: Can It Be Legally Ratified1, 52 
A.B.A.J. !126 (1966). 
28. It seems unlikely, although not impossible, that the fourteenth amendment will 
be construed to require reapportionment more often than the regular decennial census, 
or a five-year census if that becomes the regular practice of the Census Bureau. 
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force periodic suspension of article V in regard to legislative ratifica-
tion and force use of the alternative route of state ratifying conven-
tions, which, incidentally, might also be suspect if the same districts 
were used. Further, there would be little basis for distinguishing, 
and continuing to observe, the rule that a malapportioned legisla-
ture is empowered to pass general legislation or even elect a governor, 
as in Georgia.29 Consistency of principle under such a Caesar's-wife 
rule would seem to require as well the nullification of all enactments 
of lame-duck legislatures, even if properly apportioned. 
Attempts have been made to make the argument more plausible 
by suggesting two limitations.3° First, it is said that only reapportion-
ment amendments would be affected because citizens would lack 
the requisite degree of personal interest for standing to challenge 
other kinds of amendments. This reasoning assumes, of course, that 
conceded voter standing for direct attack on state legislature appor-
tionment could be extended to cover the somewhat different question 
of the ratification process for a federal reapportionment amendment. 
It also assumes that courts would take a narrow view of citizen stand-
ing to challenge non-reapportionment amendments. However, prior 
to the notion expressed by the four concurring justices in Coleman v. 
Miller that judicial review of constitutional amendment issues was 
foreclosed on political question grounds, the Court in a series of 
suits had litigated a number of questions concerning the validity 
of the prohibition and women suffrage amendments without being 
troubled by standing considerations.31 Recent cases, moreover, sug-
gest a trend to ease requirements of standing so that citizens may 
more easily litigate public law issues, such as, church-state relation-
ships32 and reapportionment itself. 
The second limitation would confine the asserted legislative dis-
ability to those bodies judicially declared malapportioned at the 
time. Absent such a ruling an unreconstructed or malapportioned 
legislature could still validly ratify a federal reapportionment amend-
ment. This limitation is based on the sound principle that consti-
tutional amendments must at some point be final, so as to avoid 
the confusion and uncertainty of retroactive invalidation. This lim-
itation, however, brings with it new problems of arbitrariness. It 
introduces the random factor of variant plaintiff and judicial vigor 
29. See note 25 supra. 
30. Wolf, supra note 27, at 328-30. 
31. See cases cited in note 14 supra. 
32. E.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 
(1962). But cf. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
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in timing and pressing reapportionment suits. It also would operate 
differently in different states because of divergences of judicial opin-
ion on what constitutes "malapportionment." A ten or fifteen per 
cent deviation from average size district (and substantially higher 
in the "first round" lower court cases after Reynolds v. Sims) has been 
acceptable in some states but not in others. Not to put too fine a 
point on it, the argument against ratification of any federal amend-
ment by malapportioned legislatures has an instinctive appeal but 
concededly sweeps in too much if not limited; and, limitations of 
the principle have their own shortcomings. 
Hence, in an attempt to avoid all doubts, it can be expected 
that any future reapportionment amendment, like Senator Dirksen's 
ill-fated 1966 proposal, will provide for ratification by state con-
ventions rather than state legislatures. It should be noted, however, 
that similar objections may be made to the convention if it is not 
properly apportioned. 
A ratifying convention, after all, is not the same thing as a 
statewide popular referendum which intrinsically follows one man-
one vote. If delegates may be elected from legislative districts,33 the 
convention could be in outward form a carbon copy of the state 
legislature. Although its members are delegates rather than legis-
lators and would be chosen only on the basis of their commitment 
to vote yes or no on the amendment in question, the factor of dis-
tortion of popular will caused by unequally sized districts would 
still be present in important degree. Not eliminated at all would be 
the vice common to all district voting systems: the distortion of the 
result caused by ignoring the surplus plurality in any given district 
-these are, in effect, "wasted votes." The statewide popular major-
ity actually may lose if its strength is heavily concentrated in a mi-
nority of districts. 
B. Should We Amend Article V To Conform 
to One Man-One Vote? 
In short, under article V we are forced to hard choices of how 
properly to implement ratification with legislatures which will be 
recurrently malapportioned because of the combination of tight 
equality requirements and differential population growth. It may not 
be satisfactory to use reductio ad absurdum as an all-encompassing 
33. See ·E. Brown, R.ATttICATION OF THE TwENTY-FIRS'l' .AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES! STATE CONVENTION RECORDS AND LAws 515-19 (1938). 
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exoneration for the ills of our present practice. Perhaps it is time 
to take a fresh look at article V itself. Some of the problems raised 
above would be mooted by terminating entirely the practice of state 
legislative ratification and using only state ratifying conventions. 
Other problems would be obviated if the entire ratification section 
of article V were rewritten to authorize statewide popular referenda 
as the sole method for ratification of federal amendments. 
All problems would vanish, and "one man-one vote" theory 
would be fully honored, only by going further and authorizing 
nation-wide popular referenda as the sole ratification device for 
federal constitutional amendments. Only thus can we avoid the 
distorting feature of surplus pluralities stemming from the state 
units which would still be present in the half-way house device of 
intrastate referenda. In ratification of federal amendments by state 
legislatures or conventions there are as many districts-and con-
sequent distortions-as there are state legislative districts, approx-
imately 5,000. In ratification by statewide popular referenda there 
are still fifty districts,, the states themselves. Only in ratification by 
nationwide popular referenda is there an undistorted national pop-
ular response to the national issue of changing the Constitution 
which rules us all. 
Such a shift, of course, may be too great a change from our 
"federal" or "states rights" heritage to accept all at once. But, if 
one man-one vote be taken seriously, the choice should be between 
such a truly national ratification process and use of statewide refer-
enda. In the former the "federal" interest still would be preserved 
by the role of the United States Senate in the initiation process; in 
the latter the "federal" principle would be preserved again by the 
Senate role and by the unit participation of the states in ratifica-
tion. Neither ratification procedure now authorized in article V-
by state legislatures or conventions commonly elected from the very 
same districts-is conceptually consistent with the "one man-one 
vote" revolution. 
Ill. THE UNUSED FEDERAL CONVENTION PROCESS 
One of the best-known "dead letter" clauses in the federal Con-
stitution is that part of article V which authorizes constitutional 
amendment by the process of a constitutional convention. A con-
vention "shall" be called by Congress on "application" of two-thirds 
of the states, with subsequent ratification accomplished by the usual 
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alternatives of approval by three-fourths of the states acting either 
through their legislatures or state conventions. It is understandable 
that the Founding Fathers, sitting in a constitutional convention, 
should have wished to authorize further conventions as an alterna-
tive to constitutional change by congressional initiation. It is, how-
ever, also understandable that the convention device has never been 
used; piecemeal constitutional revision, which is all the people have 
ever desired, is more expeditiously handled by congressional initia-
tion. The state initiation procedure of article V has become, there-
fore, only a "protest clause"-a device for venting popular protest 
against congressional refusal to initiate a given amendment. 
Because other participants in this symposium are giving detailed 
attention to the many questions raised by this alternative method 
(now part of the Dirksen campaign), this Article shall touch on only 
one or two aspects of interest. The first assumes that a sufficient 
number of states petition Congress, which then refuses to call a con-
vention notwithstanding the seemingly mandatory language of arti-
cle V. Would this congressional refusal to call a convention be a 
"political question" beyond the reach of judicial power, or could 
Congress by court order be forced to act? In 1965 at an early stage 
in the reapportionment amendment struggle, Senator Douglas pre-
dicted that Congress would not-and implied that he would not-
honor a "call" for convention "even if two-thirds of the State legis-
latures pass the applications." He doubted that Congress could "be 
forced to do so."34 
It is true that despite both Baker v. Carr,35 involving state legis-
lative reapportionment, and Wesberry v. Sanders,36 concerning con-
gressional redistricting, there is no precedent for orders by a federal 
court directed to the President or Congress. Both Baker and Wes-
berry could be enforced by federal court orders against state legis-
latures. Considerations both of power to enforce the order, and of 
separation of powers at the national level of government, might 
induce a court to avoid a clash with Congress on the call of a con-
stitutional convention. Such considerations led the Supreme Court 
in the past to refuse to enjoin President Andrew Johnson from en-
forcing reconstruction legislation.37 To be sure, in 1952 the Court 
34. Hearings on Reapportionment of State Legislatures Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 35, 40 (1965) (statement of Senator Paul Douglas). 
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
36. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
37. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (Wall.) 475 (1866). 
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did invalidate President Truman's seizure of steel mills during a 
strike, but the injunction was directed to the Secretary of Com-
merce and in any event was a negative order rather than a com-
mand to act.38 If this be the case, then what remedy exists? 
Another question is the composition of the convention. Article 
V seems to vest plenary power in Congress to provide for the size, 
composition, and method of choosing delegates of the convention. 
In exercising this power, Congress might simply provide for elec-
tion of a convention parallel to Congress itself, that is, with dele-
gates elected by congressional districts and at large in the states. 
This would mean obviously that the delegation elected from states 
at large-corresponding to the Senate-would be grossly malappor-
tioned by population. Although article V may expressly authorize 
Senate malapportionment by exempting it from constitutional 
amendment, it does not authorize parallel convention malappor-
tionment. It would be an anomaly to establish a national conven-
tion to deal with state legislative apportionment which was itself 
malapportioned. The problem would be minimized by modeling a 
national convention on the House of Representatives and basing 
it solely on congressional districts, but this would still overrepresent 
the smallest states, because each state is guaranteed at least one 
Representative and some states have less population than the na-
tional norm for a congressional district. In a properly apportioned 
national convention-following the emerging rule-of-thumb of some 
courts that a district deviation of more than ten per cent ( or even 
less) is suspect-some smaller states could have no delegates of their 
own unless the convention were made quite large. 
For example, if Alaska, the smallest state by population, were 
to be given one vote in a national convention and if all other states 
were to be given voting strength in direct proportion to that of 
Alaska, there would be 804.7 votes cast at the convention.39 Although 
New York's present congressional delegation is 41, at the convention 
New York would cast 74.2 votes. The other states now having only 
one representative in the House-Delaware, Nevada, Vermont, and 
Wyoming-would cast 2.0, 1.3, 1.7, and 1.5 votes, respectively. Only 
Alaska's vote would be the same as its House vote. Alternatively, if 
the size of the convention were limited to 435 with no state guar-
anteed at least one vote, and if votes were apportioned according 
to a strict system of population ratios, Alaska, Neva~a, Vermont, 
38. Youngstown Sheet&: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
39. That is, dividing each state's 1960 population by that of Alaska-226,167. 
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and Wyoming would not have a whole vote of their own. Vermont 
might have a full vote, however, if a ten per cent deviation were 
deemed permissible, because its population is within ten per cent 
of the ratio. 
Many of the questions raised in the past several years would be 
dealt with in Senator Ervin's bill to establish procedures for calling 
and holding a national constitutional convention. Again, detailed 
discussion of that subject is left to the Senator and other partici-
pants, except to raise one question which the bill does not clearly 
answer. The bill provides that Congress is to determine the number 
of resolutions received and to ascertain whether or not they are on 
the "same subject." Congress then has a "duty" to call a federal con-
stitutional convention. Could Congress also check the "federal valid-
ity" of the state applications under now-hidden meanings of article 
V? Senator Ervin's bill ignores this point. State legislatures are to 
be the exclusive judge of the "validity of adoption" of the resolu-
tion in each state, but this is a different question from the question 
of "federal validity." 
Even without exhausting here all of the possible complexities, 
the state petition and federal convention route to constitutional 
amendment emerges as a veritable can of worms and seems un-
likely to be used successfully. For this reason many find it difficult 
to take seriously this portion of article V, despite the intent of the 
Founding Fathers to keep open an amendment route not subject 
to congressional control. Although perhaps few persons now share 
the deep sense of nation-state tensions and fears which underlay 
adding the state petition clause to article V, situations can be imag-
ined even in this age where the disposition of congressional forces, 
including a Senate filibuster, could block initiation of an amend-
ment which, if submitted, would receive adequate popular support 
for ratification. 
Perhaps by analogy to the practice in some states--and under 
the impelling force of the "one man-one vote" principle-we should 
explore the advisability of proposing federal amendments by some 
process of national popular initiative. Alternatively, and again by 
state analogy, initiation could be effected by two successive Con-
gresses by an absolute majority (or even simple majority), in lieu 
of the present requirement of a two-thirds vote. This would lessen 
the power of an obdurate Congress to block desired change, yet 
retain a procedure which recognizes the serious nature of constitu-
tion amending. 
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IV. Is ARTICLE V SIMPLY IRRELEVANT? 
The drive for congressional initiation of a reapportionment 
amendment and the ensuing campaign to accomplish the same goal 
by constitutional convention seem to have failed for the time being. 
Some of the particular proposals had little merit; others, focussing 
on a very limited modification of the "one man-one vote" principle 
and on recurring population referenda, were more appealing in 
principle but difficult to incorporate in appropriate constitutional 
text. As the reapportionment amendment controversy fades, it leaves 
us with these far broader issues: Is the formal amendment article 
irrelevant to the larger public law controversies of our day? Is it 
totally irrelevant where modification of a Supreme Court decision 
is involved? With regard to the latter issue, it is certainly too late 
in the day to deny that courts do dramatically and effectively change 
the Constitution. Supreme Court justices on occasion admit to 
"amending" the Constitution, or at least accuse their brethren of 
it, which amounts to the same thing.40 
Is there cause for concern when a proposal for a constitutional 
amendment leads more to a national diatribe than to a national 
dialogue? The present-day champions of the Court and viewers-
with-alarm of the amending process may be classed as political "lib-
erals." But liberals have not always been on the side of the Court, 
nor have "conservatives" always opposed it. Indeed the Court was 
frequently so pro-property from the Civil War to the New Deal 
that attacking the Court, in the name of democracy, was a standard 
liberal pastime. Hence, the present degree of anti-article V feeling, 
in the cause of keeping Court decisions inviolate, is historically 
anomalous. Court decisions have changed, yes. But has democratic 
theory regarding the proper repository of ultimate control changed 
that much? Control made too "ultimate" is not "control" at all. 
So, although we begin with the question of a reapportionment 
amendment we end with a much larger question: Is article V irrel-
evant to the grander issues of constitutional form and policy which 
we call constitutional law? The unique American process of judi-
cial review, so foreign to our English or continental forebears, is 
for us a traditional and valued process. Few now fail to perceive 
and admit that it is a major form of American policy-making. But 
is it not a condition of the exercise of such great power that it be 
40. See, e.g., Justice Black in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 342 (1964); Justice 
Harlan in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964). 
948 Michigan Law Review 
deemed to be honorably subject to the process of constitutional 
amendment? 
Postulate, for example, the conditions of 1936, with no prospect 
for change of heart by the Supreme Court majority in the near 
future. The country wants to go forward, but the Court stands in 
the way of congressional legislation. A Senate filibuster blocks con-
stitutional amendment by congressional initiation. Two-thirds of 
the state legislatures are persuaded to call a constitutional conven-
tion to overturn the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) decision, 
the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) decision and others. 
Unfortunately, the texts of the state petitions differ. Some focus on 
the AAA decision and the relation of the tax-spend power to the 
reserved powers doctrine. Others focus on the NIRA decision and 
the separation of powers doctrine. Still others focus on the com-
merce clause aspect of the NIRA decision. To complicate the issue 
further, all of the problems of a possible runaway convention are 
cogently raised by the conservatives who do not want the Court's 
decisions upset. In the context of 1936 would we have-or should 
we have-backed off from the convention process for constitutional 
change? 
